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Abstract
The secrecy capacity of a network, for a given collection of permissible wiretap sets, is the maximum
rate of communication such that observing links in any permissible wiretap set reveals no information
about the message. This paper considers secure network coding with nonuniform or restricted wiretap
sets, for example, networks with unequal link capacities where a wiretapper can wiretap any subset of k
links, or networks where only a subset of links can be wiretapped. Existing results show that for the case
of uniform wiretap sets (networks with equal capacity links/packets where any k can be wiretapped),
the secrecy capacity is given by the cut-set bound, and can be achieved by injecting k random keys at
the source which are decoded at the sink along with the message. This is the case whether or not the
communicating users have information about the choice of wiretap set. In contrast, we show that for
the nonuniform case, the cut-set bound is not achievable in general when the wiretap set is unknown,
whereas it is achievable when the wiretap set is made known. We give achievable strategies where
random keys are canceled at intermediate non-sink nodes, or injected at intermediate non-source nodes.
Finally, we show that determining the secrecy capacity is a NP-hard problem.
Index Terms
Secrecy capacity, network coding, information-theoretic security, cut-set bound, network interdic-
tion, NP-hard.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretically secure communication uses coding to ensure that an adversary that
wiretaps a subset of network links obtains no information about the secure message. The secrecy
capacity of a network, for a given collection of permissible wiretap sets, is defined as the
maximum rate of communication such that any one of the permissible wiretap sets reveals
no information about the message. In general, the choice of wiretap set is unknown to the
communicating users, though we also discuss the case of known wiretap set where the encoding
and decoding functions are allowed to depend on the choice of wiretap set, in which case the
secrecy capacity is the maximum rate achievable under the worst case wiretap set.
A theoretical basis for information-theoretic security was given in the seminal paper by Wyner
[1] using Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy [2], where a coset coding scheme based on a linear
maximum distance separable code was used to achieve security for a wiretap channel. More
recently, information-theoretic security has been studied in networks with general topologies.
The secure network coding problem, where a wiretapper observes an unknown set of links, was
introduced by Cai and Yeung [3]. They proposed a coding strategy, which we refer to as the
global key strategy, in which the source injects random key symbols that are decoded at the
sink along with the message. They showed achievability of this strategy in the nonuniform case
where a wiretapper can observe one of an arbitrary given collection of wiretap link sets, and
optimality of this strategy for multicast in the uniform case where each link has equal capacity
and a wiretapper can observe up to k links. For the uniform case, various constructions of secure
linear network codes have been proposed in e.g. [4], [5]. Other related work on secure network
communication includes weakly secure codes [6] and wireless erasure networks [7].
In this paper, we consider secure communication over wireline networks in the nonuniform
case. In the case of throughput optimization without security requirements, the assumption that
all links have unit capacity is made without loss of generality, since links of larger capacity can
be modeled as multiple unit capacity links in parallel. However, in the secure communication
problem, such an assumption cannot be made without loss of generality. Indeed, we show in
this paper that there are significant differences between the uniform and nonuniform cases. For
the case of uniform wiretap sets, the multicast secrecy capacity is given by the cut set bound,
whether or not the choice of wiretap set is known, and is achieved by the global key strategy
[3]. In contrast, the nonuniform case is more complicated, even for a single source and sink. We
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3show that the secrecy capacity is not the same in general when the location of the wiretapped
links is known or unknown. We give new achievable strategies where random keys are canceled
at intermediate non-sink nodes or injected at intermediate non-source nodes, and show that these
strategies can outperform the global key strategy. Finally, we show that determining the secrecy
capacity is an NP-hard problem.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper we focus on acyclic graphs for simplicity; we expect that our results can be
generalized to cyclic networks using the approach in [8], [9] of working over fields of rational
functions in an indeterminate delay variable.
We model a wireline network by a directed acyclic graph G=(V,E), where V is the vertex set
and E is the directed link set. Each link (i,j)∈E is a noise-free bit-pipe with a given capacity
ci,j . We denote the set of incoming links (w,v) of a node v by I(v) and the set of outgoing
links (v,w) of v by O(v).
A source node s∈V observes a random source process Xs taking values from a discrete
alphabet Xs. A sink node d∈V wishes to reconstruct Xs with probability of error going to zero
with the coding blocklength.
An eavesdropper can wiretap a set A of links chosen from a known collection W of possible
wiretap sets. Without loss of generality we can restrict our attention to maximal wiretap sets,
i.e. no set in W is a subset of another. The choice of wiretap set A is unknown to the
communicating nodes, except where otherwise specified in this paper. In the case of known
wiretap set, the wiretapper can choose an arbitrary wiretap set A in W which is then revealed
to the communicating nodes.
A block code of blocklength n is defined by a mapping
f (n)e :X
n
s →{1,... ,2
nce}, e∈O(s)
from Xns to the vector transmitted on each outgoing link e of the source s, a mapping
f (n)e :
∏
d∈I(v)
{1,... ,2ncd}→{1,... ,2nce}, e∈O(v)
from the vectors received by a non-source node v to the vectors transmitted on each outgoing
link e of v, and a mapping
g
(n)
d :
∏
d∈I(d)
{1,... ,2ncd}→X ns
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4from the vectors received by the sink d to the decoded output. Node mappings are applied in
topological order; each node receives input vectors from all its incoming links before applying
the mappings corresponding to its outgoing links.
The secrecy capacity is defined as the highest possible source-sink communication rate for
which there exists a sequence of block codes such that the probability of decoding error at
the sink goes to zero and, for any choice of A∈W , the message communicated is information
theoretically secret, i.e. has zero mutual information with the wiretapper’s observations.
In Section III we give a cut set bound and achievable strategies for this general problem. In
Sections IV and V, we show that the cut set bound is unachievable and that finding the secrecy
capacity is NP hard, even for the following special cases:
1) Scenario 1 is a wireline network with equal link capacities, where the wiretapper can
wiretap an unknown subset of k links from a known collection of vulnerable network
links.
2) Scenario 2 is a wireline network with unequal link capacities, where the wiretapper can
wiretap an unknown subset of k links from the entire network.
It is convenient to show these results for Scenario 1 first, and then show the corresponding results
for Scenario 2, by converting the Scenario 1 networks considered into corresponding Scenario
2 networks for which the same result holds.
Although, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on single-source single-sink networks, the cut-
set bound and strategy 2 in Section III can be easily extended to multicast networks, whereas
the results discussed in Sections IV and V directly apply to both multicast and non-multicast
cases since the single-source single-sink case represents a special case for both.
III. CUT-SET BOUND AND ACHIEVABLE STRATEGIES
In this section, we consider the general wireline problem with unequal link capacities where
the eavesdropper can wiretap an unknown set A of links chosen from a known collection
W of possible wiretap sets. We state a cut-set upper bound on capacity, and give two new
achievable strategies and examples in which they outperform the existing global key strategy.
Using the combined intuition from these examples, we show in Section IV that the cut-set bound
is unachievable in general. One of the achievable strategies is used in Section V to show that
finding the secrecy capacity in general is NP-hard.
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5A. Cut-Set Bound
Let Sc denote the set complement of a set S. A cut for x,y∈V is a partition of V into two
sets Vx and Vcx such that x∈Vx and y∈Vcx. For the x−y cut given by Vx, the cut-set [Vx,Vcx] is
the set of links going from Vx to Vcx, i.e.,
[Vx,V
c
x]={(u,v)|(u,v)∈E , u∈Vx, v∈V
c
x} . (1)
Theorem 1: Consider a network of point-to-point links, where link (i,j) has capacity ci,j . The
secrecy capacity is upper bounded by
min
{Vs:Vs is an s−d cut}
min
A∈W
∑
(i,j)∈[Vs,Vcs ]∩A
c
ci,j. (2)
This bound applies whether or not the communicating nodes have knowledge of the chosen
wiretap set A.
Proof: Consider any source-sink cut Vs and any wiretap set A∈W . Denote by X the
transmitted signals from nodes in Vs over links in [Vs,Vcs ] and denote by Y and Z the observed
signals from links in [Vs,Vcs ] and in [Vs,Vcs ]∩A respectively. We consider block coding with block
length n and secret message rate Rs. By the perfect secrecy requirement H(M |Zn)=H(M) we
have
nRs≤H(M |Z
n)
(a)
≤H(M |Zn)−H(M |Yn)+nǫn
=H(M |Zn)−H(M |Yn,Zn)+nǫn
=I(M ;Yn|Zn)+nǫn
(b)
≤I(Xn;Yn|Zn)+nǫn
=H(Xn|Zn)−H(Xn|Yn,Zn)+nǫn
≤H(Xn|Zn)+nǫn
≤n
∑
(i,j)∈[Vs,Vcs ]∩A
c
ci,j+nǫn,
(3)
where ǫn→0 as n→+∞ and
(a) is due to Fano’s inequality;
(b) is due to the data processing inequality and the fact that M→Xn→Yn→Zn forms
a Markov chain;
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6If the choice of wiretap set A is known to the communicating nodes, the cut-set bound in
this case is also (2), which is achievable using a network code that does not send any flow on
links in A. In contrast, we show in Section IV that the cut-set bound is not achievable in general
when the wiretap set A is unknown.
B. Achievable Strategies for Unknown Wiretap Set
In the case of unit link capacities, the secrecy capacity can be achieved using global keys
generated at the source and decoded at the sink [3]. The source transmits Rs secret information
symbols and Rw random key symbols, where Rs+Rw is equal to the min-cut of the network. This
scheme does not achieve capacity in general networks with unequal link capacities. Intuitively,
this is because the total rate of random keys is limited by the min cut from the source to the
sink, whereas more random keys may be required to fully utilize large capacity cuts with large
capacity links.
Capacity can be improved by using a combination of local and global random keys. A local key
is injected at a non-source node and/or canceled at a non-sink node. However, it is complicated
to optimize over all possible combinations of nodes at which keys are injected and canceled.
Thus, we propose the following more tractable constructions, which we will use to develop
further results in subsequent sections.
Strategy 1: Random Keys Injected by Source and Possibly Canceled at Intermediate Nodes
Our first construction achieves secrecy with random keys injected only at the source. The
source carries out pre-coding so that random keys are canceled at intermediate nodes and the
sink receives the intended message without interference from the random keys. As such, it applies
in the single-source, single-sink case, and is useful in networks where the incoming capacity of
the sink is too small to accommodate the message plus all the keys needed in the network. An
example is given in Fig. 1, where each link has unit capacity, the number of wiretapped links
is k=2, and only the first layer of the three layer network is allowed to be wiretapped. The
secret message rate Rs=3 is achievable by using the strategy in Fig. 1, where the operation is
on a finite field GF (5). In Fig. 1, a,b,c are secret messages and f,g are keys. The message
on the i-th link in the first layer is denoted as xi, i=1,2,3,4,5. The key f is canceled at the
second layer and the key cancelation scheme is labeled on the last layer links. It is easy to
see that H(xi,xj |a,b,c)=2, ∀i 6=j which means perfect secrecy is achieved. At the same time,
October 27, 2018 DRAFT
7s d
ia
iy
ix
ic
ib
j1
j4
j3
j2
x1=a+b+c+f+2g
x2=2a+b+c+f+g
x3=a+b+2c+f+4g
x4=a+b+c+2f+2g
x5=a+b+c+2f+g
x2-x1=a+4g
x1+x3-x4=a+b+2c+4g
x4-x5=g
x2-x3=a+4c+2g
Fig. 1. An example of Strategy 1, where any two of the five links in the first layer can be wiretapped. Capacity 3 is achieved
by canceling at the second layer one of the two random keys injected by the source. The operation is on a finite field GF (5).
the sink d can decode a,b,c and the key g. When key cancelation is not applied, let Rs and
Rw be the secrecy rate and the random key rate at the source, respectively. Let z be the total
rate of transmission on the first layer. To achieve secrecy, we must have Rw≥ 25z, where the
cut-set condition on the first layer requires Rs+Rw≤z. Since the sink needs to decode both
message and random key symbols from the source, the cut-set condition on the last layer requires
Rs+Rw≤4. Combining these we obtain Rs≤maxzmin(4− 25z,
3
5
z)= 12
5
, which is strictly less
than 3.
To formally develop the Strategy 1 construction, we will use the following result:
Claim 1 ( [10, Corollary 19.21]): Given an acyclic network, there exists, for a sufficiently
large finite field, a linear network code in which the dimension of the received subspace at each
non-source node t is min(ω,maxflow(t)), where ω is the dimension of the message subspace.
Let Rs denote the secret message rate and zi,j the transmission rate on each network link
(i,j)∈E , whose values we will discuss how to choose below. Consider the graph G with the
capacity of each link (i,j)∈E set as zi,j≤ci,j . As illustrated in Fig. 2, augment the graph as
follows:
• Connect each subset of links A∈W to a virtual node tA: more precisely, for each directed
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t{(s,ia),(s,ib)}
d'
t{(s,ix),(s,iy)}
d{(s,ia),(s,ib)}
d{(s,ix),(s,iy)}
Fig. 2. Illustration of Strategy 1, an achievable construction where random keys are injected by the source and possibly canceled
at intermediate nodes. In this figure, k=2 and only the 5 links in the first layer can be wiretapped.
link (i,j)∈E in the network, create a node vi,j and replace (i,j) by two links (i,vi,j) and
(vi,j,j) of capacity zi,j , and for each (i,j)∈A create a link (vi,j,tA) of capacity vi,j . Let
Rs→A be the max flow/min cut capacity between s and tA.
• Add a virtual sink node d′ and join the actual sink d to d′ by a link (d,d′) of capacity of
Rs.
• Connect both tA and the virtual sink d′ to a virtual sink dA by adding a link (tA,dA) of
capacity Rs→A and a link (d′,dA) of capacity Rs, respectively.
The source sends a secret message v=[v1,... ,vRs ]T along with Rw random key symbols
w=[w1,... ,wRw ]
T
.
1 The values of Rs, Rw, and zi,j are chosen such that each virtual sink dA can
decode Rs+Rs→A linear combinations of message and random key symbols, and the sink d can
decode the Rs message symbols. Specifically, if for each A the rate Rs+Rs→A equals the min-
cut capacity between the source and the virtual sink dA and Rs→A≤Rw, by using Claim 1, there
exists a network code such that each dA receives Rs+Rs→A linearly independent combinations
1We assume that Rs and Rs→A are integers, which can be approximated arbitrarily closely by scaling the capacity of all
links by the same factor.
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9of v and w when the finite field size is sufficiently large (q>(|E|
k
)). Let the signals received at a
particular virtual sink dB be denoted as MB[vT ,wT ]T , where MB is an (Rs+Rs→B)×(Rs+Rw)
received coding matrix with full row rank. We can add Rw−Rs→B rows to MB to get a full
rank (Rs+Rw)×(Rs+Rw) square matrix M˜B. We then precode the secret message and keys
using M˜−1B , i.e., the source transmits M˜−1B [vT ,wT ]T , so that link (d′,dB) carries v.
Claim 2: Strategy 1 allows the sink to decode the message v and achieves perfect secrecy.
Proof: Since (d,d′) is the only incoming link of (d′,dB), and both links have capacity Rs
which is equal to the rate of the message v, link (d,d′) carries exactly v. This implies that sink
d receives v. Furthermore, for any virtual sink dA, the received coding matrix with precoding
is MAM˜−1B , which is a full row rank matrix. As MAM˜−1B is a full row rank matrix, the coding
vectors of the received signals from the set A of wiretapping links span a rank Rs→A subspace
that is linearly independent of the set of coding vectors corresponding to message v received
on (d′,dA). Therefore, the signals received on A are independent of the message v, and perfect
secrecy is achieved.
Note that applying M˜−1B causes the random keys injected by the source to be either canceled
at intermediate nodes or decoded by the sink.
It remains to optimize over values of Rs, Rw and zi,j such that for each A the rate Rs+Rs→A
equals the min-cut capacity between s and dA and Rs→A≤Rw. Since computing Rs→A (the
min-cut capacity between s and tA) for arbitrary zi,j involves a separate max flow computation,
to simplify the optimization, we can constrain Rs→A to be equal to some upper bound UA on
Rs→A, and thereby obtain an achievable secrecy rate using Strategy 1. For instance, we can take
UA to be
∑
(i,j)∈Azi,j , or alternatively take UA to be the min-cut capacity between s and tA on
the graph with the original link capacities ci,j . We can write a linear program (LP) for this key
cancelation strategy as follows:
max Rs
subject to
∑
(i,j)∈E
fAi,j−
∑
(i,j)∈E
fAj,i=


Rs+UA, if i=s,
−Rs−UA, if i=dA,
0, otherwise,
∀A∈W,
fAi,j≤zi,j≤ci,j , ∀(i,j)∈E ,
(4)
where fAi,j represents the rate of flow on link (i,j) intended for the virtual sink dA. The conditions
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on conservation of flow fAi,j ensure that the min cut between the source and dA is at least Rs+UA.
Since the only incoming links of dA are (tA,dA) of capacity Rs→A and (d′,dA) of capacity Rs,
this implies that Rs→A equals the upper bound UA. Thus, the optimal value of (4) gives an
achievable secrecy rate.
Strategy 2: Random Keys Injected by Source and/or Intermediate Nodes and Decoded at Sink
In strategy 2, any node in the network can inject random keys. The sink is required to decode
both the secret message and the random keys from all nodes, i.e. keys are not canceled within the
network, while the random key rates must be sufficient to “fill” each wiretap set (in a sense that
is made precise below). Although for simplicity of notation the algorithm description below is
for the single-source, single-sink case, this strategy applies directly to multiple-source multicast
case. If random keys are injected only at the source, the strategy reduces to the global key
strategy in [3]. Note that under the assumption that only the source knows the message and
different nodes do not have common randomness, here we cannot apply the key cancelation
and precoding idea from Strategy 1, since after applying the precoding matrix each node may
potentially be required to transmit a mixture of the source message and other nodes’ random
keys.
Let Rw,v be the random key injection rate at node v. As before, Rs denotes the secret message
rate at the source and zi,j the transmission rate on link (i,j). We will address the choice of these
rates below. Consider the graph G with the capacity of each link (i,j)∈E set as zi,j . Connect
each subset of links A∈W to a virtual node dA: more precisely, for each directed link (i,j)∈E
in the network, create a node vi,j and replace (i,j) by two links (i,vi,j) and (vi,j,j) of capacity
zi,j , and for each (i,j)∈A create a link (vi,j,dA) of capacity vi,j . Intuitively, we want the max
flow/min cut capacity from the message and random key sources to dA to be equal to that in the
absence of the message. Similarly to strategy 1, we simplify the optimization by constraining
this max flow/min cut capacity to be equal to an upper bound,
∑
(i,j)∈Azi,j . Specifically, we have
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the following LP:
max Rs
subject to
∑
j
fAi,j−
∑
j
fAj,i


=−
∑
(i′,j′)∈Azi′,j′, if i=dA,
≤Rw,i, otherwise,
∀A∈W,
∑
j
f di,j−
∑
j
f dj,i=


−
(
Rs+
∑
v∈V ,v 6=dRw,v
)
, if i=d,
Rs+Rw,s, if i=s,
Rw,i, otherwise,
fAi,j≤zi,j , f
d
i,j≤zi,j , zi,j≤ci,j , ∀(i,j)∈E ,
(5)
where the first set of equations corresponds to the requirement that the network accommodates
a flow fA of size
∑
(i,j)∈Azi,j from the random key sources to dA, the second set of equations
corresponds to the requirement that the network accommodates a flow f d, of size equal to the
sum of the message and random key rates, from the message and random key sources to the
sink d, and the third set of inequalities corresponds to the link capacity constraints.
Claim 3: Strategy 2 allows the sink to decode the message v, and achieves perfect secrecy.
Proof: As illustrated in the example of Fig. 3, consider an augmented network with
• a virtual source node us connected to the source node s by a directed link (us,s) of capacity
Rs, and connected to each virtual sink dA by a directed link (us,dA) of capacity Rs, and
• a virtual node uk connected to each node v by a directed link (v,uk) of capacity Rw,v,
and connected to each virtual sink dA by a directed link (uk,dA) of capacity
∑
vRw,v−∑
(i,j)∈Azi,j .
The source information enters the network at the virtual source node us and is transmitted
to each virtual sink dA. Consider a multi-source multicast problem on this network, where the
actual sink node and the virtual sinks dA each demand the source message and all the random
keys. By the first constraint of the LP, the max flow from the random key sources to dA in
the original network equals
∑
(i,j)∈Azi,j; together with the additional capacity in the augmented
network (∑vRw,v−
∑
(i,j)∈Azi,j from the random key sources and Rs from us), the max flow
from the message and random key sources to each virtual sink dA is sufficient to ensure that the
multicast problem is feasible [11]. A capacity-achieving code for this multicast problem in the
transformed graph corresponds to a code for the original secrecy problem, since the information
received by each virtual sink dA from the set A of original network links must be independent
of information received from the additional links, which includes the entire source message.
October 27, 2018 DRAFT
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s d
uk
us
d1
d2
a
b
Fig. 3. An example of the augmented network construction for the proof of correctness of strategy 2, where s,a,b,d are nodes
of the original graph, and only one of the two links (s,a) and (s,b) can be wiretapped.
ds
ia
iy
ix
ic
ib
j1
j4
j3
j2
Fig. 4. Example of the usefulness of Strategy 2.
October 27, 2018 DRAFT
13
An example where this strategy is useful is given in Fig. 4, which is obtained by interchanging
the source and the sink as well as reversing all the links in Fig. 2. At most three links in the last
layer can be wiretapped. By injecting one local key at node j2 and two global keys at the source,
Strategy 2 can achieve secrecy rate 2. On the other hand, if random keys are only injected at
the source, the secrecy rate is at most 8
5
. Let Rs and Rw be the secrecy rate and the random
key rate at the source, respectively. Let z be the total rate of transmission on the last layer. To
achieve secrecy, we must have Rw≥ 35z, where the min-cut condition on the last layer requires
Rs+Rw≤z. Since the source injects all the random keys, the min-cut condition on the first layer
requires Rs+Rw≤4. Combining these we obtain Rs≤ 85 , which is strictly less than 2.
From the examples, we see that the types of scenarios in which Strategy 1 and Strategy
2 are useful seem to be complementary. In general, these two strategies can be combined to
obtain a higher secrecy rate. We use these strategies conceptually in the following sections to
develop theoretical results. However, for numerical computation of achievable rates in scenarios
1 and 2, we note that the number of possible wiretapping sets, and thus the size of the LPs, are
exponential in the size k of each wiretap set, so they are useful for small k.
IV. UNACHIEVABILITY OF CUT SET BOUND
In the case of unrestricted wiretapping sets and unit link capacities, the secrecy capacity is
equal to the cut-set bound [3]. In this section we show that the cut-set bound (2) is not achievable
in general, by considering the example in Fig. 5, where the set of wiretappable links is restricted
(Scenario 1). We give an explicit proof that the cut set bound is not achievable for the case
when the wiretap set is unknown. We also use the program Information Theoretic Inequalities
Prover (Xitip) [12] to show that the secrecy capacity is bounded away from the cut set bound.
We then convert the example into one with unequal link capacities (Scenario 2), and show the
unachievability of the cut set bound for this case also.
A. Restricted Wiretap Set (Scenario 1)
Consider the example in Fig. 5, where all links have unit capacity and any three of the five
middle layer links can be wiretapped. Let the middle layer links be 1-5 (from top to bottom) and
the last layer links be 6-8 (from top to bottom). Let the signal carried by link i be called signal
i, or Si. Let the source information be denoted X . The cut-set bound, or the secrecy capacity
with known wiretap set, is 2.
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s d
1
2
3
4
5
8
7
6
c
b
a
g
f
e
Fig. 5. An example to show that the secrecy rate without knowledge of wiretapping set is smaller than that with such knowledge.
The wiretapper can wiretap any three of the five links in the middle layer.
To provide intuition for the case when the wiretap set is unknown, we first show that secrecy
rate 2 cannot be achieved by using scalar linear coding. Then, the argument is converted to an
information theoretic proof that secrecy rate 2 cannot be achieved by using any possible coding
scheme.
Suppose secrecy rate 2 is achievable with a scalar linear network code. First note that the
source cannot inject more than unit amount of random key, otherwise the first layer cannot carry
two units of source data. Let the random key injected by the source be denoted K. For the case
when the source injects a unit amount of random key, we first have the following observations.
Signal 6 must be a function of signal 1, otherwise if the adversary sees the signals 2-4 then he
knows signals 6-7. Also, signal 8 must be a function of signal 5, otherwise if the adversary sees
signals 1, 2 and 4, then he knows signals 7-8. Similarly we can show that signal 8 must be a
function of signal 1, and signal 7 must be a function of signal 2. We consider the following two
cases.
Case 1: signal 5 is a linear combination of signals present at the source node. To achieve
the full key rank condition on links 1, 2 and 5, node a must put two independent local keys k1
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and k2 on links 1 and 2 respectively. Link 7, whose other input is independent of k2, is then
a function of k2. Similarly, Link 8 is a function of k1. This means that the last layer has two
independent local keys on it.
Case 2: signal 5 is a linear combination of signals present at the source node as well as a
local key k injected by node c.
Case 2a: k is also present in signal 1. Then k is present in signal 6, and is independent of
the key present in signal 7.
Case 2b: k is not present in signal 1. Then k is present in signal 8, and is independent of the
key present in signal 7.
In all three cases 1, 2a, and 2b, there is a pair of last layer links which are functions of
two independent random keys, leaving capacity for only one unit of secret message. Thus, we
conclude that the secrecy rate without knowledge of the wiretapping set by using only linear
network coding is less than two.
We now extend the above argument to any coding scheme which leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: For the wireline network in Fig. 5 a secrecy rate of 2 is not achievable with any
possible coding scheme, if any three out of the five links (1-5) in the middle layer are wiretapped
and the location of those links is unknown.
Proof: See Appendix.
We can also show that the secrecy rate is bounded away from 2 by using the framework
for linear information inequalities [13]. Let X be the message sent from the source and Zi,
i=1,2,3 be the signals on the links adjacent to the source. We want to check whether H(X)≤ω
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is implied by
(1) H(Zi)≤1, H(Sj)≤1, i=1,2,3, j=1,... ,8,
(2) H(X|S6,S7,S8)=0,
(3) I(X,Z1,Z2,Z3,S4,S5,S7,S8;S6|S1,S2,S3)=0,
(4) I(X,Z1,Z2,Z3,S1,S3,S5,S6,S8;S7|S2,S4)=0,
(5) I(X,Z1,Z2,Z3,S2,S3,S6,S7;S8|S1,S4,S5)=0,
(6) I(X ;S1,S2,S3)=0, I(X ;S1,S2,S4)=0,
(7) I(X ;S1,S2,S5)=0, I(X ;S1,S3,S4)=0,
(8) I(X ;S1,S3,S5)=0, I(X ;S1,S4,S5)=0,
(9) I(X ;S2,S3,S4)=0, I(X ;S2,S3,S5)=0,
(10) I(X ;S2,S4,S5)=0, I(X ;S3,S4,S5)=0,
(11) I(S1;Z2|Z1,Z3)=0, I(S2;Z2,Z3|Z1)=0,
(12) I(S3;Z3|Z1,Z2)=0, I(S4;Z1,Z3|Z2)=0,
(13) I(S5;Z1,Z2|Z3)=0, I(S1;S4|Z1,Z2,Z3)=0,
(14) I(S2;S4,S5|Z1,Z2,Z3)=0, I(S3;S5|Z1,Z2,Z3)=0,
(15) I(S4;S1,S2,S5|Z1,Z2,Z3)=0, I(S5;S2,S3,S4|Z1,Z2,Z3)=0,
(16) I(S1,S2,S3,S4,S5;X|Z1,Z2,Z3)=0,
(6)
where the first inequality is the capacity constraint, the second constraint shows that the sink
can decode X , constraints (3) to (5) mean that the signals in the last layer are independent of
other signals given the incoming signals from the middle layer, constraints (6) to (10) represent
the secrecy constraints when any three links in the middle layer are wiretapped, and constraints
(11) to (16) represent the conditional independence between the signals in the first layer and
those in the middle layer. In particular, (16) shows that X→(Z1,Z2,Z3)→(S1,... ,S5) forms a
Markov chain. Note that constraints (3) to (5) and (11) to (16) implicitly allow some randomness
to be injected at the corresponding nodes. We use the Xitip program [12], which relies on the
framework in [13], to show that H(X)≤5/3 is implied by the set of equalities (6). Therefore,
5/3 is an upper bound on the secrecy rate when the location of wiretapper is unknown, which
is less than the secrecy rate 2 achievable when such information is known. Therefore, there is
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s d
1
2
3
4
5
8
7
6
c
b
a
g
f
e
z1=w+x+y
z2=2w+3x+2y
z3=4w+3x+5y
s1=z1+z3+u=5w+4x+6y+u
s2=z1+3u=w+x+y+3u
s3=z1+z2+5u=3w+4x+3y+5u
s4=z2=2w+3x+2y
s5=z3=4w+3x+5y
s6=2s1+s2-s3
    =w+5x+3y
s7=s4=2w+3x+2y
s8=s5=4w+3x+5y
Fig. 6. A coding scheme achieving secrecy rate 1 without knowledge of the wiretap set for the network in Fig. 5, where any
three of the five middle layer links can be wiretapped. w is the secret message, x and y are keys injected at the source, and u
is a key injected at node a and canceled at node e. The operations are over a finite field GF (7).
a strict gap between the secrecy capacity and the cut set bound.
On the other hand, the secrecy rate for the wireline network in Fig. 5 is at least 1 which
is shown by the example in Fig. 6, where a finite field GF (7) is used. In this example, a
combination of strategies 1 and 2 is used, where keys are injected inside the network and are
also canceled at intermediate nodes.
B. Unequal Link Capacities (Scenario 2)
We have restricted the wiretapped links to be in the middle layer in Fig. 5. We next show
that the unachievability of the cut-set bound also holds for the secure network coding problem
with unequal link capacities (Scenario 2). We convert the example of Fig. 5 by partitioning each
non-middle layer link into 1
ǫ
parallel small links each of which has capacity ǫ. Any three links
can be wiretapped in the transformed graph. We prove the unachievability of the cut-set bound
in the transformed network.
First, we show a lower bound on the min-cut between the source and the sink in the transformed
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network when three links are deleted. Note that deleting any k′ (k′≤3) non-middle layer links
reduces the min-cut by at most k′ǫ. When k′=0, the min-cut is 2. When k′=1 or at most two
middle layer links are deleted, the min-cut is at least 2 after deleting these middle layer links, and
the min-cut is at least 2−k′ǫ≥2−ǫ after further deleting the k′=1 non-middle layer link. When
k′=2 or at most one middle layer link is deleted, the min-cut between the source and the sink
is 3 after deleting this middle layer link, and the min-cut is at least 3−k′ǫ≥3−3ǫ after further
deleting the k′ non-middle layer links. Therefore, the cut-set bound is at least min(2−ǫ,3−3ǫ).
For the case where the location of the wiretap links is unknown, we prove the unachievability
of the cut-set bound in the transformed network. First, consider the transformed network with
the restriction that the wiretapper can only wiretap any 3 links in the middle layer. The optimal
solution is exactly the same as for the original network of the previous subsection, and achieves
secrecy rate at most 5/3. Now, consider the transformed network without the restriction on
wiretapping set, i.e., the wiretapper can wiretap any 3 links in the entire network. As wiretapping
only the middle layer links is a subset of all possible strategies that the wiretapper can have, the
secrecy rate in the transformed network is less than or equal to that in the former case, which is
strictly smaller than the cut-set bound for ǫ strictly smaller than 1
4
. Therefore, the cut-set bound
is still unachievable when the wiretap links are unrestricted in the transformed graph.
V. NP-HARDNESS
We show in the following that determining the secrecy capacity is NP-hard by reduction from
the clique problem, which determines whether a graph contains a clique2 of at least a given size
r.
When the choice of the wiretap set is made known to the communicating nodes, the secrecy
capacity is given by the cut-set bound, from Theorem 1, and is achieved by not transmitting on
the wiretapped links. Finding the cut-set bound involves determining the worst case wiretap set.
This is equivalent to the network interdiction problem [14], which is to minimize the maximum
flow of the network when a given number of links in the network are removed. It is shown
in [14] that the network interdiction problem is NP-hard. Therefore, determining the secrecy
capacity for the case where the location of the wiretap links is known is NP-hard.
2A clique in a graph is a set of size r of pairwise adjacent vertices, or in other words, an induced subgraph which is a
complete graph.
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Fig. 7. Example of NP-hardness proof for the case with knowledge of the wiretapping set.
To show that determining the secrecy capacity for the case where the location of the wiretap
links is unknown is NP-hard, we use the construction in [14] showing that for any clique problem
on a given graph H, there exists a corresponding network GH whose secrecy capacity is r when
the location of the wiretap links is known if and only if H contains a clique of size r. We then
show that for all such networks GH, the secrecy capacity for the case when the location of the
wiretap links is unknown is equal to that for the case when this information is known, which
shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the clique problem and the secrecy
capacity problem.
We briefly describe the approach in [14] in the following. Given an undirected graph H=
(Vh,Eh), we will define a capacitated directed network GˆH such that there exists a set of links Aˆ′
in GˆH containing less than or equal to |Eh|−
(
r
2
)
links such that GˆH−Aˆ′ has a maximum flow of
r if and only if H contains a clique of size r. For a given undirected graph H=(Vh,Eh) without
parallel links and self loops, we create a capacitated, directed graph GH=(N ,A) as follows: For
each link e∈Eh create a node ie in a node set N1 and for each vertex v∈Vh create a node jv in a
node set N2. In addition, create source node s and destination node d. For each link e∈Eh, direct
a link in GH from s to ie with capacity 2 and call this set of links A1. For each link e=(u,v)∈Eh,
direct two links in GH from ie to jv and ju with capacity 1, respectively and call this set of
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links A2. For each vertex v∈Vh, direct a link with capacity 1 from jv to d. Let this be the set of
links A3. This completes the construction of GH=(N ,A)=({s}∪{d}∪N1∪N2,A1∪A2∪A3).
In Fig. 7, we give an example of the graph transformation, where H=({1,2,3,4},{a,b,c,x,y}).
We use the following result from [14]:
Lemma 1 ( [14, Lemma 2]): Let GH be constructed from H as above. Then, there exists a
set of links A′1⊆A1 with |A′1|=|Eh|−
(
r
2
)
such that the maximum flow from s to d in GH−A′1
is r if and only if H contains a clique of size r.
After obtaining GH, we generate GˆH by replacing each link (ie,jv) with |Eh| parallel links each
with capacity 1/|Eh| and call this link set Aˆ2. We carry out the same procedure for links (jv,d)
and call this link set Aˆ3. Then GˆH=(N ,A)=({s}∪{d}∪N1∪N2,A1∪Aˆ2∪Aˆ3). For the case
when the location of wiretap links is known, it is shown in [14] that the worst case wiretapping
set Aˆ′ must be a subset of A1. By using Lemma 1, this case is NP-hard.
Now, we consider the secrecy capacity when k=|Eh|−
(
r
2
)
and the wiretapping set is unknown.
From Lemma 1, the condition that H contains a clique of size r is equivalent to the condition
that the max-flow to the sink in GH after removing any k links from A1 is at least r. We now
show that the latter condition is equivalent to the condition that the secrecy capacity of GH
when the wiretapper accesses any unknown subset of k links from A1 (Scenario 1) is at least r.
For each subset A′ of k links from A1, we create nodes tA
′
1 and dA′1 with their corresponding
incident links as described in Strategy 1. As the wiretapped links each have capacity 2 and are
connected to the source directly, the min-cut between the source and each virtual sink dA′1 is at
least 2k+r. Then, by using Strategy 1 the secrecy rate r is achievable.
Finally, we show that the same condition is also equivalent to the condition that the secrecy
capacity of GˆH when any k links are wiretapped (Scenario 2) is at least r. Since each second
layer link has a single first layer link as its only input, wiretapping a second layer link yields
no more information to the wiretapper than wiretapping a first layer link. When some links
in the third layer are wiretapped, let the wiretapping set be Aˆ′=Aˆ′1∪Aˆ′3 where |Aˆ′3|≥1 and
|Aˆ′1|≤k−1. Thus A1−Aˆ′1 contains at least
(
r
2
)
+1 links. We create nodes tAˆ′ and dAˆ′ with their
corresponding incident links as described in Strategy 1. Since removing links in A1 corresponds
to removing links in H, after removing links in H corresponding to Aˆ′1, H contains a subgraph
H1 containing
(
r
2
)
links plus at least one link e=(u,v).
Case 1: H1 is a clique of size r. In this case, the number of vertices with degree greater than
0 in H1∪e is r+2.
October 27, 2018 DRAFT
21
Case 2: H1 is not a clique. H1 contains at least r+1 vertices with degree greater than 0.
According to [14, Lemma 1], the max-flow in GH is equal to the number of vertices in H
with degree greater than 0. In both cases, the max-flow of GH after removing links in Aˆ′1 is at
least r+1. Let R˜s→Aˆ′
3
be the max-flow capacity from the source to Aˆ′3 in GˆH−Aˆ′1.
We can use a variant of the Ford-Fulkerson (augmenting paths) algorithm, e.g., [15], as follows
to construct a max-flow subgraph D from s to Aˆ′3 in GˆH−Aˆ′1 satisfying the property that after
removing D from GˆH−Aˆ′1, the min-cut between s and d is at least
r+1−R˜s→Aˆ′
3
≥ r+1−|Aˆ′3|/|Eh|
≥ r+1−(|Eh|−1)/|Eh|
> r, (7)
where we have used |Aˆ′3|≤|Eh|−1. Considering the network GˆH−Aˆ′1 with all link directions
reversed, we construct augmenting paths via depth first search from d to s, starting first by
constructing augmenting paths via links in Aˆ′3, until we obtain a set of paths corresponding
to a max flow of capacity R˜s→Aˆ′
3
between s and Aˆ′3. We add further augmenting paths until
we obtain a max flow (of capacity at least r+1) between s and d, which may cause some of
the paths traversing links in Aˆ′3 to be redefined but without changing their total capacity. The
subgraph D consists of the final set of paths traversing links in Aˆ′3. Thus, the paths remaining
after removing D have a total capacity lower bounded by (7).
Therefore, the min-cut between the source and dAˆ′ in GˆH−Aˆ′1−D is at least r, and the
min-cut between the source and dAˆ′ in GˆH is at least r+Rs→Aˆ′
1
+R˜s→Aˆ′
3
=r+Rs→Aˆ′ . By using
Strategy 1, a secure rate of r is achievable when Aˆ′ is wiretapped. Thus, the secrecy rate for the
case when the location of the wiretap links is unknown is equal to that for the case when such
information is known with an unrestricted wiretapping set. We have thus proved the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: For a single-source single-sink network consisting of point-to-point links and an
unknown wiretapping set, computing the secrecy capacity is NP-hard.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the secrecy capacity of wireline networks where different links
have different capacities. In particular, it was shown that the secrecy capacity is not the same in
general when the location of the wiretapped links is known or unknown; in the former case the
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capacity is given by a cut-set bound, which is unachievable in general in the latter case. Further,
we proposed achievable strategies where random keys are canceled at intermediate non-sink
nodes, or injected at intermediate non-source nodes. Finally, we showed that determining the
secrecy capacity is an NP-hard problem.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove Theorem 2 by contradiction. Suppose that a secrecy rate of 2 is achievable for the
network in Fig. 5. As before, let X and K denote respectively the secret message and random
key injected by the source node, and Si the signal on link i. Then each triple of links in the
middle layer has zero mutual information with the source data, and each pair of links in the
middle layer has joint conditional entropy 2 given the other three links.
Since the message X is decodable from information on the last layer, we have I(S6,S7,S8;X)=
2. Since I(S1,S2,S3;X)=0, by the data processing inequality I(S6;X)=0, therefore, I(S7,S8;X|S6)=
2 and H(S7|S6)=I(S7;X|S6)=1. Then, H(S7|X,S6)=H(S7|S6)−I(S7;X|S6)=0. This implies
that S7 does not depend on random keys injected by nodeS f or head(4) which would be indepen-
dent of X,S6. Similarly, I(S8;X)=0, implying H(S7|S8)=I(S7;X|S8)=1 and H(S7|X,S8)=0.
Thus, S7 does not depend on random keys injected by node head(2) which would be independent
of X and S6. In a similar manner, we can show that S6 and S8 also do not depend on
any random keys injected after the middle layer. Also, since H(S7,S8|S6)≥I(S7,S8;X|S6)=
2 and H(S6)≥H(S6|S8)=1, therefore H(S6,S7,S8)=3. Let SA denote the adversary’s ob-
servations. By the secrecy requirement, H(S6,S7,S8|SA)=2, which implies I(S6,S7,S8;SA)=
H(S6,S7,S8)−H(S6,S7,S8|SA)=1.
Then, the mutual information I(S6;S2,S3)=0, otherwise, if the adversary sees signals 2-4 his
mutual information with signals 6-7 is greater than 1. The mutual information I(S8;S1,S4)=0,
otherwise if the adversary sees signals 1, 2, 4 his mutual information with signals 7-8 is greater
than 1. The mutual information I(S8;S4,S5)=0, otherwise if the adversary sees signals 2, 4, 5 his
mutual information with signals 7-8 is greater than 1. The mutual information I(S7;S4,S5)=0,
otherwise if the adversary sees signals 1, 4, 5, his mutual information with signals 7-8 is greater
than 1.
Case 1: signal 5 is a function of only signals present at the source node, i.e., H(S5|X,K)=0.
By the zero mutual information condition for links 1, 2 and 5, H(S1,S2,S5|X)=3, so
H(S1,S2,S5|X,K)=H(S1,S2|X,K,S5)=2. (8)
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Since S4 is conditionally independent of S1, S2 given X and K, we have H(S1,S2|X,K,S4,S5)=
2, I(S1,S2;X,K,S4,S5)=0 and I(S1,S2;X,K|S4,S5)=0. Now
I(S1,S2,S7,S8;X,K|S4,S5)=I(S7,S8;X,K|S4,S5)+I(S1,S2;X,K|S7,S8,S4,S5)
=I(S1,S2;X,K|S4,S5)+I(S7,S8;X,K|S1,S2,S4,S5).
(9)
Since S7,S8 is conditionally independent of X,K given S1,S2,S4,S5, we have
I(S7,S8;X,K|S1,S2,S4,S5)=0. (10)
Then by the non-negativity of conditional mutual information,
I(S7,S8;X,K|S4,S5)≤I(S1,S2;X,K|S4,S5)=0. (11)
Next, note that S1 and S2 are conditionally independent given S4 and S5, since H(S1|S4,S5)=
H(S2|S1,S4,S5)=1. Therefore S7 and S8 are conditionally independent given S4 and S5, i.e.
I(S7;S8|S4,S5)=0. Since H(S7|S4,S5)=H(S7)−I(S7;S4,S5)=1, it follows that H(S7|S8,S4,S5)=
1. Then we have
I(S7,S8;S4,S5)=I(S8;S4,S5)+I(S7;S4,S5|S8)
=I(S8;S4,S5)+H(S7|S8)−H(S7|S4,S5,S8)=0+1−1=0.
(12)
So, I(S7,S8;X,K,S4,S5)=I(S7,S8;X,K|S4,S5)+I(S7,S8;S4,S5)=0, and therefore H(S7,S8|X)≥
H(S7,S8|X,K,S4,S5)=2, which contradicts the requirement that there is at most 1 unit of
random key on the last layer.
Case 2: signal 5 is not a function only of signals present at the source
Case 2a: signal 1 has nonzero mutual information with some random key injected at node c.
Then H(S1|X,K,S2,S3,S4)>0. For brevity, let A=(S2,S3) and Y =(X,K,S4). Since I(S6;A)=
0 and H(S6|S1,A)=0, we have H(A)+H(S6)=H(A,S6)≤H(A,S1)=H(S1)+H(A|S1). Since
H(S6)=H(S1), we have H(A)=H(A|S1) and so H(S1|A)=H(S1). Then from H(S1,S6|A)=
H(S1|A,S6)+H(S6|A)=H(S6|A,S1)+H(S1|A), we have H(S1|A,S6)=0. Since H(S1|A,Y,S6)≤
H(S1|A,S6)=0 and H(S6|A,Y,S1)≤H(S6|A,S1)=0, from
I(S1;S6|Y,A)=H(S1|A,Y )−H(S1|A,Y,S6)=H(S6|A,Y )−H(S6|A,Y,S1)>0 (13)
we have H(S6|A,Y )=H(S1|A,Y )>0. Then since H(S7|S2,S4)=0, we have H(S6|S7,X)>0.
Also, since H(S7|X)=1, we have H(S6,S7|X)>1.
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Case 2b: signal 1 has zero mutual information with any random key injected at node c.
Then H(S5|X,K,S1,S2,S4)>0. Similar reasoning as for case 2a applies with A=(S1,S4), Y =
(X,K,S2), S5 in place of S1, and S8 in place of S6.
From Cases 1, 2a, and 2b, we conclude that the secrecy rate without knowledge of the
wiretapping set by using any nonlinear or linear coding strategy is smaller than two obtained
for the case where such knowledge is present at the source.
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